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Dispute Settlement under the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: A
Preliminary Assessment
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe*
Abstract
The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) will add a new dispute
settlement system to the plethora of judicial mechanisms designed to resolve trade disputes in
Africa. Against the discontent of Member States and limited impact the existing highly legalized
trade dispute settlement mechanisms have had on regional economic integration in Africa, this
paper undertakes a preliminary assessment of the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM). In particular, the paper situates the AfCFTA-DSM in the overall discontent and
unsupportive practices of African States with highly legalized dispute settlement systems and
similar WTO-Styled DSMs among other shortcomings. Notwithstanding the transplantation of
the WTO-Styled DSM, the paper argues that the Consultation Phase, offers the AfCFTA Member
States a realistic chance of engaging with the DSM. In addition, the paper highlights other
factors such as private sector involvement, strategic operationalisation of the DSM, geopolitical
and power dynamics as critical to the success of the dispute settlement system.
I. Introduction
The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) is the latest effort by African
States to restructure the international economic order from below. By increasing intra-African
trade, the AfCFTA aims to create a large single African market for goods, services and
movement of persons.1 The AfCFTA Phase I negotiations comprise of three key agreements:
Protocol on Trade in Goods; Protocol on Trade in Services; and the Protocol on Dispute
Settlement.2 The Protocol on Trade in Goods include provisions relating to the elimination of
duties and quantitative restrictions on imports, rules of origin, trade facilitation and transit, trade

Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Canada. Ph.D., (University of
Ottawa); LLM (University of Toronto), LLB (Hons) (University of Lagos, Nigeria), BL (Hons) (Nigerian Law
School, Abuja); email: olabisi.akinkugbe@dal.ca. An earlier draft and aspects of this paper were presented as “The
Prospects of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement: A Critical
Overview” at The Judicial Power of Africa’s Supranational Courts, September 18, 2018, University of Luxembourg,
Luxembourg; and, the Purdy Crawford Emerging Business Law Scholars Workshop, October 19-20, 2018, Schulich
School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. The author thanks Dr. Richard Frimpong Oppong for his
comments on the initial draft of this paper; Noah M. Entwistle for his research assistance; and the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the Insight Research Grant.
1 Article 6, Scope. Pursuant to Art. 7, the Phase II Negotiation rounds are designed to address specific protocols on
intellectual property rights, investment, and competition policy.
2 The Phase 2 Negotiations of the AfCFTA will focus on contentious issues such as intellectual property rights,
investment, competition policies, and possibly e-commerce.
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remedies, protections for infant industries and general exceptions among others.3 The Protocol
on Trade in Services provides for transparency in service regulations, progressive liberalization
of services sectors and mutual recognition of standards, licencing and certification of services
suppliers among African states.4 The formal commitments enshrined in the AfCFTA will build
on the modest gains recorded in the context of informal intra-African trade.5 To the extent that an
integrated African economy would strengthen competitiveness of the local industries, enhance
the realization of economies of scale for domestic producers, boost industrialization, enhance
better allocation of resources and attract foreign direct investments, the AfCFTA has the
potential to restructure both international and intra-African economic relations.6 However,
viewed against the background of struggles by African states to maximize existing economic
integration objectives, the AfCFTA is a bold and ambitious agreement.
An important feature of the AfCFTA is the Protocol on Dispute Settlement which provides for
the rules and procedures for the settlement of disputes within the AfCFTA. Unlike the majority
of the African regional economic community courts that are modelled after the Court of Justice
of the European Union, the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism (AfCFTA-DSM) is
modelled after the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding.7 This is not the
first time that an African trade dispute mechanism has been modelled after the WTO model.8
The Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement between three regional economic communities in
Africa – COMESA, EAC and SADC – preceded the AfCFTA. Its DSM is also based on the
David Luke, “Making the Case for the African Continental Free Trade Area”, AfronomicsLaw Blog, January 15,
2019, Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/12/making-the-case-for-the-african-continental-free-tradearea-2/
4 Ibid.
5 See, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, “Issues in African Informality: What is the Relevance for Regional or
Continental Integration?”, (2018) 48:1 African Insight, pp. 41-61; (Special Issue on Borders, Informal Cross-border
Economies and Regional Integration in Africa, Guest Edited by Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, Samuel Ojo
Oloruntoba, & Innocent Moyo); Cristina Mitaritonna, Joachim Jarreau and Sami Bensassi, “Regional Integration
and Informal Trade in Africa: Evidence from Benin’s Borders”, (2018) Journal of African Economies, pp. 1-30; The
Economist, “Informal trade is ubiquitous in Africa, but too often ignored”, Sept 1 2018, online:
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/09/01/informal-trade-is-ubiquitous-in-africa-but-toooften-ignored
In the context of the AfCFTA, Mariam Olafuyi, argues that it is important to avoid overlooking the
informal sector. See, Mariam Olafuyi, “The Informal Economy and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement:
Making Trade Work for the Often Overlooked”, AfronomicsLaw Blog, January 15, 2019, Online:
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/10/the-informal-economy-and-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreementmaking-trade-work-for-the-often-overlooked/
6 See, Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, “Africa has phenomenal potential for intra-continental
trade”, 27 August 2018, https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1838; Mesut Saygili, Ralf
Peters and Christian Knebel, “African Continental Free Trade Area: Challenges and opportunities of Tariff
Reductions”, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Research Paper No. 15,
UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/15,
February
2018.
Online:
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ser-rp2017d15_en.pdf
7See, James Thuo Gathii, “Evaluating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free trade
Agreement”, Afronomicslaw Blog, April 10, 2019; Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/10/evaluatingthe-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement/; Karen J. Alter, “The Global
Spread of European Style International Courts”, (2012) 35 West European Politics, pp. 135-154.
8 For an analysis of the SADC Trade Tribunal and its overlap with the WTO dispute settlement system, see, Joost
Pauwelyn, “Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and other Jurisdictions”, (2004) 13 Minn. J. Global Trade, pp. 231-304
3
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WTO model. While there is nothing inherently wrong in the transplantation of dispute systems
such as the WTO model, the success of such transplants depends on the extent of the adaptation
to the socio-political realities of the destination. In Africa, whether the model was transplanted
from the European Union or the WTO, the experience reveals a strong discontent and apathy
towards a highly legalized and formal trade dispute system. In relation to the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the East African Community (EAC), the discontent has manifested in one form of
backlash or the other with varying success.9 While the conundrum that has arisen from the
discontent remains, the shift towards a more rules-based dispute mechanism under the AfCFTA
exacerbates this problem.
In the ensuing section of this paper, I examine the challenges of operationalizing the AfCFTA’s
DSM. I situate the AfCFTA-DSM in the context of discontent with similar WTO-styled DSM in
African regional economic communities, and international arbitration at the national level.
Drawing on these analyses, I argue that there is every reason to be sceptical about the potential of
the AfCFTA-DSM. Yet, there are reasons to be optimistic about the potential of the AfCFTADSM to influence the substantive aspiration of a single African market in ways that the existing
trade dispute settlement systems have not. To do this, I suggest that African leaders and the
negotiators should draw on lessons from the experiences of existing regional economic courts to
inform an AfCFTA-DSM that is Africa-centric in its norms. Finally, I draw attention to the
critical role of the private sector and business for the success of the DSM; as well as geopolitical
challenges and power dynamics of the African continent as a relevant factor that must be borne
in mind in operationalizing the AfCFTA and its DSM.
In terms of structure, in section II, I provide a brief overview of the substantive provisions of the
AfCFTA. In section III, I analyze the steps in an AfCFTA dispute as enshrined in the Protocol on
Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Dispute. The AfCFTA-DSM is a transplantation of
the WTO dispute settlement system. Despite the poor record of formal trade dispute by African
States, I argue that Consultation, the informal process for settling disputes amicably offers the
AfCFTA Member States the most realistic chance of engaging with the AfCFTA-DSM. In
section IV, I deepen the analysis of the AfCFTA-DSM by situating it in the broader context of
discontent with similar WTO-styled dispute settlement system at the regional level in Africa and
the broader growing apathy with international arbitration by African states at the national level.
To contextualize the analysis, I draw on the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement (TFTA). In the concluding section, I briefly
examine four factors that are critical to the success of the AfCFTA-DSM, particularly in the
implementation phase.
II. The African Continental Free Trade Area – An Overview
On 9 March 2018, the African Union (AU) Ministers of Trade approved the Declaration
launching the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA, the AfCFTA Agreement, Protocol on Trade
in Goods and associated annexes, Protocol Trade in Services and its annexes, as well as the
Karen J. Alter, Laurence Helfer, and James Thuo Gathii, “Backlash against International Courts in West, East and
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences”, (2016), European Journal of International Law, Vol. 27 No. 2, 293–
328
9
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Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes.10 The AfCFTA has a general
and specific set of objectives that are mutually reinforcing. The general objectives of the
AfCFTA, inter alia, are the creation of a single market for goods, services, and movement of
persons and investments among African countries; creation of a liberalised market for goods and
services based on successive rounds of negotiations; lay the foundation for the establishment of a
Continental Customs Union and enhance the competitiveness of the economies of African States
both with the continent and the global market.11 The agreement aspires towards a better
coordination of African trade regimes and the elimination of challenges associated with multiple
and overlapping trade agreements across the continent.12
Although the AfCFTA is progressive in enshrining provisions that aims to address the perennial
problem of multiple and overlapping trade agreements, the practicality or modus operandi for
achieving the objective remains obscured in light of the historical trajectories and heterogeneity
of the different regions in Africa. The objectives of the agreement also include socio-economic
development, gender equality, structural transformation of the state parties,13 as well as
healthcare.14
The AfCFTA will come into force thirty (30) days after ratification by the parliaments of at least 22 countries.
Art. 23 – Entry into Force. For the “Status of AfCFTA Ratification”, see, TRALAC’s AfCFTA Ratification
Barometer, https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographics/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html
11 See Art. 3 – General Objectives. See, Jonathan B. Rudahindwa, “IEL and the AfCFTA: Beyond Trade
Liberalisation, Economic Transformation and Development”, AfronomicsLaw Blog, February 11, 2019,
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/11/iel-and-the-afcfta-beyond-trade-liberalisation-economic-transformationand-development/; David Luke and Jamie MacLeod, Inclusive Trade in Africa: The African Continental Free Trade
Area in Comparative Perspective, (2019: Routledge).
12 Art. 3(h) provides that the general objectives of the AfCFTA includes the resolution of “the challenges of multiple
and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and continental integration processes.” Article 1(t) of the
Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA lists the eight (8) Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the
AU, to wit, Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC). See, Collins C.
Ajibo, “Regional Economic Communities as the building blocs of African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement:
Challenges
and
Way
Forward”
AfronomicsLaw
Blog,
February
4,
2019,
Online:
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/04/regional-economic-communities-as-the-building-blocs-of-africancontinental-free-trade-area-agreement-challenges-and-way-forward/
13 See, Oyeniyi Abe, “Gender Mainstreaming and Empowerment under Agreement for the Establishment of the
African
Continental
Free
Trade
Area”,
January
30,
2019,
AfronomicsLaw
Blog,
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/30/gender-mainstreaming-and-empowerment-under-agreement-for-theestablishment-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta/
Similarly, Vera Songwe, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
noted that “One of the big indirect effects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) will be that
women become a lot more economically empowered…” See, Saïd Business School News, “AfCFTA will boost
economic empowerment of women in Africa”, 22 March 2019; online: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/news/afcfta-willboost-economic-empowerment-women-africa
14 Walter Ochieng, “Will Free Trade Make Africans Sick?”, Project Syndicate, April 15, 2019; https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/africa-free-trade-agreement-health-risks-by-walter-ochieng-2019-04. With respect to
healthcare, Walter Ochieng argues has been neglected with “alarming oversight” in the discourse so far. Further, he
notes that “the pact raises concerns about the weakening of government-funded public-health systems, increasingly
unequal access to care, a medical brain-drain, higher drug prices, increased consumption of unhealthy products, and
the spread of diseases. African governments should act immediately to assess these threats and counter the
AfCFTA’s potential negative health implications.”
10
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To realize the general objectives, the AfCFTA provides for the following specific measures: the
State Parties are to progressively “eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods” and
“liberalise trade in services”; cooperate “on investment, intellectual property rights and
competition policy on all trade-related areas”, and “on customs matters and the implementation
of trade facilitation measures”; establish “a mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning
their rights and obligations; and “maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and
administration of the AfCFTA.”15 Article 5 of AfCFTA incorporates principles such as variable
geometry16; consensus decision-making; adoption of regional economic community free trade
areas and as building blocs; as well as best practices in the RECs, State Parties, and International
Conventions binding the African Union among other traditional provisions in trade agreements.
The institutional framework for governance and implementation of the AfCFTA consists of the
Assembly, as the highest organ, and in descending order, the Council of Ministers, the
Committee of Senior Trade Officials and the Secretariat.17
The foregoing provisions of the AfCFTA is ambitious and aims for a rules-based continental
trading regime. The implementation of the agreement, which has been a major problem in
previous regional economic integration schemes in Africa, is critical to its success. For example,
the African Economic Community, which was established by the Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community, 1991, is a case in point. This treaty came into force in 1994. It envisages
the establishment of an African Economic Community in six treaty-defined stages, over a period
of 34 years. Going by those treaty-defined stages, there should be by now at least an African
Common Market. Another continental initiative that has achieved less than the desired impact is
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Hence, an important factor for the
implementation of the AfCFTA is that it must reflect the socio-economic and political realities
and practices of its Member States. Even as it aims to construct a new continental economic
order, it must not only build on the formal experiences of the regional economic communities,
but also, extend to the informal economy that make-up an important sector in intra-African trade.
Without a doubt, the effective regulation of the formal and informal economies, when combined
with the potential of the continent in information and financial technology, holds the promise of
an unprecedented leveraging of capital and resources that bode well for the future of the single
market economy.
In the next section, I analyse the substantive provisions of the AfCFTA-DSM as provided in
Article 20 and the draft Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute
Protocol).
See Article 4 (a)-(g), Specific Objectives.
For different takes on the contentious implication of this principle for African economic integration, see, Elisa
Tino, “The Variable Geometry in the Experience of Regional Organizations in Developing Countries”, (2013-2014)
18 Spanish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 141-162; Gerald Ajumbo, “Is Variable Geometry Leading to the
Fragmentation of Regional Integration in East Africa?”, African Development Bank Group, November 7, 2013,
Online: https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/industrialisation-and-trade-corner/post/is-variable-geometry-leading-to-thefragmentation-of-regional-integration-in-east-africa-12524/; James Thuo Gathii, “African Regional Trade
Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes” (2009) 35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation, p. 571;
17 Article 9. See, Gerhard Erasmus, “The AfCFTA Institutions: Could the Secretariat hold the key to
Implementation?”,
Tralac
Working
Paper
Series,
February
6,
2019.
Online:
https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13887-the-afcfta-institutions-could-the-secretariat-hold-the-key-toimplementation.html
15
16
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III. Resolution of Dispute under the AfCFTA
Dispute settlement systems play a key role in international economic integration. An active,
independent, efficient and reliable DSM is essential to not only settling disputes between the
state parties in upholding a rules-based regime; but also, critical to developing relevant
jurisprudence that will guide the single market economy objective of the constituent trade
agreement. In the AfCFTA context, the DSM will also be important for the purpose of
interpreting areas of overlap or conflict with other former judicial orders in Africa.18
Article 20 of the AfCFTA establishes the DSM. The DSM shall be administered in accordance
with the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes (“Dispute Protocol”).
The Dispute Protocol establishes a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and provides for the
settlement of dispute in a transparent, accountable, fair, and predictable way that is consistent
with the provisions of the establishing agreement.19 The DSB that will comprise of the
representatives of the AfCFTA State Parties. The DSB shall have a Chairperson to be elected by
the State Parties. The DSB has authority to establish Dispute Settlement Panels and an Appellate
Body; adopt Panel and Appellate body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of the
rulings and recommendations of the Panels and the Appellate Body; and authorize the
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the Agreement. Decisions to be taken by
the DSB shall be by consensus. The Chairperson of the DSB shall be elected by the State Parties
and will meet as often as necessary to discharge its functions. The procedure for the settlement of
disputes under the AfCFTA consists of Consultations; Good Offices, Conciliation or Mediation;
Panels; and an Appellate Body. Disputing parties can explore arbitration at first instance as a
means to settling their disputes.20 The Dispute Protocol applies to disputes between State Parties
relating to their right and obligations thereunder, subject to such special and additional rules and
procedures on dispute settlement contained in the AfCFTA. To guard against forum shopping,
where a State Party has initiated a proceeding under the Dispute Protocol regarding a specific
matter, the State Party shall not invoke another forum for dispute settlement on the same
matter.21 I will now analyze the steps in an AfCFTA dispute.
Consultations
The first step towards an informal amicable resolution of disputes between State Parties are the
Consultations.22 While the AfCFTA-DSM is under-pinned by a rules-based trading system, the
According to Gerhard Erasmus, a rules-based trading regime reduces economic and political risk for both state
and non-state actors. Gerhard Erasmus, “Dispute Settlement Under the AfCFTA”, TRALAC, (11 June 2018), online:
<https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13136-dispute-settlement-under-the-afcfta.html>.
19 Article 2 (Objective) of the Dispute Protocol
20 Art. 27 of the Dispute Protocol
21 Article 3(4), Ibid. Also see, Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, “What the African Continental Free trade Agreement Protocol
on Dispute Settlement says about the culture of African States to Dispute Resolution”, Afronomicslaw Blog, April 9,
2019;
Online:
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/09/what-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreementprotocol-on-dispute-settlement-says-about-the-culture-of-african-states-to-dispute-resolution/
22 Article 6(1), 7, Ibid. In the context of the Consultation process of the WTO in its early days, see, William J.
Davey and Amelia Porges, “Performance of the System I: Consultations & Deterrence”, (1988) 32:3 The
International Lawyer, pp. 695-707
18
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State Parties recognize the relational nature of trade and have provided for a preliminary step that
aims to reach an agreement without invoking the formal DSM. Consultations will be a vital
aspect of the AfCFTA-DSM and could play an important role in the AfCFTA.23 Consultations
shall be confidential and without prejudice to the rights of any State Party in any further
proceedings.24 The State Parties to the AfCFTA undertake to accord consideration to and afford
adequate opportunity for consultations. Requests for Consultations shall be notified to the DSB
through the Secretariat in writing, giving the reasons for the request, including identification of
the issues and an indication of the legal bases for the complaint.25 Where a request for
consultations is made to another State Party, such party has ten (10) days after the receipt to
reply and is required to enter into consultations in good faith within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days after the receipt of the request. Where a notified State Party does not respond to the
request within ten (10) days and does not enter into consultations within 30 days or a period
otherwise mutually agreed, or, where the parties fail to settle a dispute through Consultations
within sixty (60) days, the State Party that initiated the Consultations may refer the matter to the
DSB requesting for the establishment of a Panel.26 A State Party with substantial trade interest in
Consultations may request to be joined within ten 10 days of the circulation of the request for
Consultations.27 The decision to allow the State Party join is left to the original parties. Where
they deny that there is a substantial interest, the interested State Party shall be free to request
consultation.
In the context of the AfCFTA, consultations provide a unique forum where parties can explore
resolution of their differences. Despite the legalization of the dispute resolution under the
AfCFTA, the State Parties can harness the benefit of the informality of the Consultations phase.28
If properly utilized, it has the potential to significantly augment the other more legalized
processes. This is more so in view of the fact that African states have a culture of non-litigation
of economic disputes between and among themselves.29
The Dispute Protocol also incorporates the use of Good Offices, Conciliation or Mediation. This
mechanism provides an example of the flexibility that is incorporated in the AfCFTA-DSM. The State Parties to a
dispute may voluntarily undertake good offices, conciliation, or mediation at any time, in a confidential manner, and
without prejudice to their rights in any other proceedings. Pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Dispute Protocol, “When
good offices, conciliation or mediation are entered into after the date of receipt of a request for consultations, the
Complaining Party must allow for a period of sixty (60) days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations
before requesting for the establishment of a panel. The Complaining Party may request for the establishment of a
Panel during the sixty (60) day period, if the State Parties to the dispute jointly consider that the good offices,
conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle the dispute.” Subject to the agreement of the disputing State
Parties, the procedure can run simultaneously with a Panel process. There are no timelines for initiating and
completing this process.
23 Gary Horlick, "The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private Practitioner's View" (Fall, 1998)
32 Int'l Lawyer 685
24 Article 7(7)
25 Article 7(3)
26 The Dispute Protocol also makes special provision for expedited process where the goods involved are perishable.
See, Articles 7(a-d)
27 On the concept of “substantial trade interest” under the GATT, see, Chi Carmody, “Of Substantial Interest: Third
Parties Under GATT”, (1997) 18 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 615-657
28 See, Margherita Melillo, “Informal Dispute Resolution in Preferential Trade Agreements” (2019) 53:1 Journal of
World Trade Law, pp. 95-128
“While it may be contended that the low record of formal intra-African trade has contributed to the near absent
record of economic integration disputes, the elephant in the room remains the embedded non-litigious culture of
29
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Despite the fact that Consultations mesh with the culture of African states towards dispute
resolution so far, a drawback of an excessive reliance on Consultations and the confidential
nature of the regime is that it may impede the development of a robust jurisprudence on the
AfCFTA. The potential popularity of Consultations as a means of settling disputes may therefore
endanger the formal regime of the DSM. Nevertheless, the informal and confidential nature of
the phase meshes with the behaviour of African States towards formal trade dispute. In other
words, the disdain of African States to use the formal, adjudicative, legalistic and rules-based
dispute mechanisms for settlement of economic integration disputes can be mitigated by the
Consultation phase of the AfCFTA. Put differently, the near none existence of formal economic
integration disputes among African states may find a natural home in the Consultations process
of the AfCFTA through the promotion of diplomacy.30 The flexibility that the Consultation
process offers also provides an opportunity for the disputing states to not only agree on mutually
acceptable outcomes, but also, back it up with voluntary enforcement. In addition, the
Consultation process with its aim being amicable settlement should not interpreted as a limitation
to exploring the legalistic and more rules-based provisions of the AfCFTA-DSM.31 In this
regard, I agree with James Thuo Gathii that “if nothing else non-litigious approaches to dispute
settlement should be understood to be bargains made in the shadow of the law – that is law is not
entirely irrelevant – settlement by diplomacy happens in the shadow of these legal
commitments.”32
Panels
The formal step towards the resolution of disputes is initiated by the constitution of a dispute
settlement Panel. Where Consultation fails, upon the request of a Complaining State Party, a
Panel shall be established by the DSB.33 The primary function of a Panel is to assist the DSB in
discharging its responsibilities under the AfCFTA.34 The deliberations of the Panel shall be
confidential, and the opinions expressed in the Panel report by individual panelists shall be

African states towards regional trade disputes between and among themselves. This fact is further evident in
previous WTO-like DSMs in Africa where the Member States have simply not engaged with the dispute settlement
regime.” See, Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, “What the African Continental Free Trade Agreement Protocol on Dispute
Settlement says about the culture of African States to Dispute Resolution” Afronomicslaw Blog, April 9, 2019.
Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/09/what-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement-protocol-ondispute-settlement-says-about-the-culture-of-african-states-to-dispute-resolution/
V. Mosoti, “Africa in the first decade of WTO dispute settlement” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law,
427.
30 See generally, R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, (New York: Praeger, 1975);
Tevor Lawson, “WTO Dispute Resolution: The Promotion of Diplomacy within an Adjudicative Model”, (*)
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 321-346, p. 321. (arguing that the “traditional concepts of negotiation,
consultation and compromise in fact flourish under a properly developed adjudication-based system of dispute
resolution.”)
31 Gary N. Horlick, “The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private Practitioner’s View”, (1998) 32
The International Lawyer, pp. 685-693.
32 James Thuo Gathii, “Evaluating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free Trade
Agreement”, Afronomicslaw Blog, April 10, 2019. Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/10/evaluatingthe-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement/
33 Article 9 (Establishment of Panels)
34 Article 12(1-3)
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anonymous.35 Panels are empowered to examine, based on the relevant provisions of the
AfCFTA, the matter referred to the DSB by the Complaining Party; and to make such findings as
will assist the DSB in making recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
Agreement.36 In making its findings, a Panel shall consult widely and regularly with the parties
while also affording the parties an adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution. A Third Party shall be joined to a Panel after notification of its substantial interests to
the Panel through the DSB and agreement of the original disputing parties.
The request for the establishment of a Panel shall indicate whether Consultations were held,
identify the specific measures at issue and provide a summary of the legal basis of the complaint
in a clear and succinct form.37 Thereafter, the DSB shall convene within fifteen (15) days of the
request and the Panel shall be constituted within ten (10) days thereafter. The Panelists shall be
selected from an indicative list or roaster of individuals that shall be established and maintained
by the Secretariat when the AfCFTA enters into force. Where after thirty (30) days, an
agreement on the composition of a Panel is not reached, upon the request of either Party, the
Head of the Secretariat, in consultation with the Chairperson of the DSB and with the consent of
the disputing State Parties is empowered to determine the composition of the Panel. With respect
to quorum of the Panels, where there are two (2) disputing State Parties, the Panel shall consist
of three (3) members and where there are more than two (2), the Panel shall comprise of five (5)
members.38 In terms of expertise, the individuals on the indicative list shall have experience in
law, international trade, or in other areas covered by the AfCFTA such as intellectual property,
or the resolution of disputes arising under international trade agreements.39 The Panelists who
shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgments shall be
impartial, independent of, and not be affiliated to or take instructions from any Party. To avoid
conflicts of interest, Panelists, who are nationals of the disputing State Parties cannot serve on a
Panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
The procedures of the Panel40 shall provide sufficient flexibility to ensure an effective and timely
resolution of disputes in a mutually satisfactory manner by the parties.41 Once the Panel has been
successfully constituted, the Panelists shall within seven (7) days determine its terms of reference
and fix the timetable for its proceedings, including the schedule for the written submissions of
the Disputing Parties. The Panel has a total of five (5) months for general matters, and one and a
half months for perishable goods to issue a final report. Where the timeline cannot be met, the
Panel shall inform the DSB in writing stating reasons for the delay together with an estimation of
the period within which the Panel Report shall be ready, such period not to exceed nine (9)
Article 17, (Confidentiality). A party to the dispute is at liberty to disclose statements of its own positions to the
public
36 Article 11(1). See Adrian T. Chua, “Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence” (1998) 16:2 Berkeley
Journal of International Law, 171-196
37 Article 9(2). Articles 13 and 14 respectively provide for the procedures where Third Parties or Multiple
Complaints are received.
38 Article 9(9)
39 Article 9(3); (4) “The Panelists shall be selected with a view to ensuring their independence and integrity and shall
have a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience in the subject matter of the dispute, unless
the Parties to the dispute agree otherwise.”
40 Article 15 (Procedures for the Panel)
41 Article 15 (5) & (6).
35
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months from the date of the Panel composition. Once the initial Panel Report is ready and has
been circulated to the parties, they have the opportunity to raise their objections in writing.42
Except a party decides to appeal, or the DSB by consensus decides not to adopt the report, the
final Panel Report must be considered, adopted and signed at a meeting of the DSB convened for
that purpose within sixty (60) days from when it was circulated. Where an appeal has been
notified, the DSB cannot consider the report for adoption until after the completion of the appeal.
The decision of the DSB is final.
Appellate Body
A standing Appellate Body (AB) composed of seven (7) persons, with three (3) forming quorum
on any case shall be established by the DSB to hear appeals from panel cases.43 Appointed by the
DSB, each AB judge will serve a four-year term with the possibility of reappointment. Like the
Panel, the AB shall “comprise of persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law, international trade and the subject matter” of the AfCFTA in general.44 With respect to
locus standi before the AB, only parties to the initial dispute have the right to appeal a Panel
report. Similarly, a Third Party that established its substantial interest before the panel may have
an opportunity to be heard via its written submissions. The proceedings of the AB shall not
exceed sixty (60) days calculated from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its
decision to appeal to the date the AB circulates its report. However, where it experiences delay,
the AB can extend its proceedings for no longer than ninety (90) days. The AB may uphold,
modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the Panel. The AB shall produce a single
report reflecting the views of the majority of its members. Where the Panel and AB concludes
that a measure is inconsistent with the AfCFTA, it shall recommend that the State party
concerned bring the measure into conformity with the Agreement.45 The Dispute Protocol also
contains provision on surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings;
compensation and the suspension of concessions or any other Obligations; and arbitration.
In summary, the foregoing represents the steps that will be followed for the formal settlement of
dispute under the AfCFTA. The DSM will however be nestled in a complex matrix of regional,
and national attitudes towards dispute settlement. In section III, I situate the AfCFTA-DSM in
the context of the discontent by Member States and failure of previous similarly WTO-styled
DSM at the regional level, international arbitration and measures taken at the national level with
a view to teasing out the challenges that are associated with the dispute settlement system under
the AfCFTA.
IV. Analyzing the AfCFTA-DSM in Context
Unlike the regional courts regime that are mostly modelled after the European Union, the
AfCFTA-DSM is modelled after the WTO-DSM. The AfCFTA-DSM is not the first time that
African states have adopted a WTO-styled dispute system. At the regional level, African States
Article 19 (Adoption of Report of a Panel)
Article 20 (Appellate Body)
44 Article 20(7).
45 Article 23 (Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations)
42
43
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have drawn inspiration from the WTO dispute settlement system. Some examples include, the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern Africa
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreements.
According to the AfCFTA’s principles, State Parties commit not only to using the Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) as the building blocs for the AfCFTA but also to draw on their
best practices while simultaneously addressing the perennial challenge of overlapping
membership. The first arena for potential challenge with the similarly styled DSM at the regional
level relates to overlapping and conflicting provisions. Article 19 which relates to “Conflict and
Inconsistency with regional agreements” directly addresses this issue. In the event of any conflict
or inconsistency between the provisions of the AfCFTA and any regional agreement, the
provisions of the AfCFTA shall prevail in respect of the specific inconsistency. However, where
a REC, customs unions or regional trade arrangement has achieved a higher level of integration
that under the AfCFTA, the higher levels shall prevail among themselves.46 While this is an
important provision for a seamless co-existence of the AfCFTA-DSM with other similar
mechanisms, a major lacuna remains the wholesome reliance of the AfCFTA-DSM on the WTO
without capitalizing on any of the burgeoning experience at the regional levels.
In the context of dispute settlement, the discrepancy in the pace of establishing regional
economic community courts with no economic integration enhancing disputes to settle begs the
question – why do African states implement dispute settlement systems that they (for the most
part) do not use for trade disputes?47
Marc D Froese has argued that African states include DSMs in their regional trade agreements
primarily as a means of expressing commitment to the REC agreement and “reinsuring” against
the breakdown of multilateral DSMs, namely the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).48 It is
doubtful how much this argument holds, in the face of the already referenced behaviour of
African States towards formal dispute settlement and, in particular, their discontent towards
legalized trade regimes. More so, the WTO is embroiled in a current struggle to save itself.49
Hence, while the WTO-DSB has been successful as a forum for dispute resolution for an
entrenched and centralized multilateral governance institution,50 a wholesale transplantation
without regard to the socio-economic, historical, political, and heterogeneity of the African
society does not capture the entire picture. A more realistic view is that of James Thuo Gathii
who argues that the adoption of the AfCFTA-DSM “reflects the preferences of a small set of
African states and technical experts, favouring a strong system of dispute settlement as a

Article 19 (1-2)
Marc D. Froese, “Regional Trade Agreements and the Paradox of Dispute Settlement” (2014) 11 Manchester J.
Int’l Econ. L. 367 at 367 (HeinOnline).
48 Ibid at 384-85.
49 See, Ujal Singh Bhatia, Chairman of the Appellate Body, “The Problems of Plenty: Challenging times for the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement System”, 8 June 2017, Release of the Appellate Body Annual Report 2016. Online:
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/ab_08jun17_e.pdf
50 See, Joel P. Trachtman, “Functionalism, Fragmentation, and the future of International (Trade) Law”, Paper
delivered at the 2018 Society of International Economic Law Robert E. Hudec lecture in International Economic
Law, Sept 20, 2018. Online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3252637; also see, William J.
Davey, “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement”, (2009) 42:1 Cornell International Law Journal, pp.
119-128.
46
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guarantee of ensuring compliance with the commitments embodies in the AfCFTA.”51 To
illustrate the discontent of African states with similar WTO-styled dispute settlement system at
the regional level, I will draw on the dispute settlement systems in Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) agreements.52
The SADC Protocol on Trade Tribunal transplants the WTO rules and dispute settlement
procedures.53 In particular, Annex VI outlines the procedure for the settlement of disputes
between member states of the SADC.54 The SADC was established in 1992 and it replaced the
previous Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. The principal objective of
the SADC Treaty was to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.55 Despite the long existence of
the Tribunal, the SADC Members have not utilized the mechanism. A major factor for this
woeful record is that Member States have the option to pursue dispute settlement before different
forums.56
Like the AfCFTA, the SADC trade tribunal has significant overlap with many dispute settlement
institutions at the regional and international levels. Joost Pauwelyn analysed the “large overlap
between the [original] SADC Protocol on Trade and WTO agreements” noting that many trade
disputes between SADC members can provide a forum shopping problem because of the fact that
the dispute could be brought before the SADC or the WTO.57 In this regard, Clement Ng’ong’ola
notes, quite appropriately that the replication of the WTO DSM can be “criticized as a quixotic
experiment, attempted without a profound appreciation of the special needs of a fledgling
institution and of the different environment obtaining in the WTO.”58 Nevertheless, Ng’ong’ola
supports the WTO styled DSM as it provides the SADC with a “more secure platform for the
implementation of decisions likely to be politically unpopular.”59 SADC Member States have
shown a significant discontent with the WTO-styled dispute settlement system. The successful
backlash that arose from the decision in Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe leading to the
suspension of the SADC Tribunal illustrates this discontent in broader context.60 But, more
James Thuo Gathii, “Evaluating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free Trade
Agreement”, AfronomicsLaw Blog, April 10, 2019. Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/10/evaluatingthe-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement/
52 The dispute settlement regime under the SADC-EU EPA is also modelled after the WTO-DSM. For a discussion
of this, see, Gerhard Erasmus, “The Settlement of Disputes under the SADC EPA”, TRALAC, 13 July 2018, Online:
https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13312-the-settlement-of-disputes-under-the-sadc-epa.html
53 Clement Ng’ong’ola, “Replication of WTO Dispute Settlement processes in SADC”, (2011)1 SADC Law Journal,
pp. 35-62.
54 SADC Protocol on Trade (Annex VI), available online: http://www.lra.org.ls/sites/default/files/2017-05/AnnexVI%20-%20Settlement%20Of%20Disputes%20Between%20The%20Member%20States.pdf
55 Muna Ndulo, “African Integration Schemes: A Case Study of the Southern African Development Community”,
(1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law 6.
56 Amos Saurombe, “An Analysis and Exposition of Dispute Settlement Forum Shopping for SADC Member States
in the Light of the Suspension of the SADC Tribunal”, (2011) 23 African Mercantile Law Journal, pp. 392 – 406.
57 Joost Pauwelyn, “Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and other Jurisdictions”, (2004) 13 Minn. J. Global Trade, pp.
231-304, p. 240
58 Ng’ong’ola, “Replication of WTO Dispute Settlement processes in SADC”, p. 60
59 Ibid.
60 Karen J. Alter, Laurence Helfer, and James Thuo Gathii, “Backlash against International Courts in West, East and
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences”, (2016), European Journal of International Law, Vol. 27 No. 2, 293–
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specifically, the SADC Trade Tribunal has not been utilized for the purpose of disputes arising
from economic integration efforts. The non-utilization of the trade tribunal is symptomatic of a
broader problem with the judicialization of disputes in formal regimes by African States.61 Given
the pervasiveness of this culture on the continent, the AfCFTA will face a similar challenge.
Even in the face of irrelevance of such dispute frameworks, and experiences such as the SADC
experience, African States have not been discouraged from adopting WTO-styled dispute
systems. The dispute settlement mechanism of the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement
(TFTA) between three regional economic communities in Africa – COMESA, EAC and SADC –
provides the latest example.62 Part IX, Article 30 relates to Dispute Settlement. It establishes a
Dispute Settlement Body with power to establish Panels, and an Appellate Body, adopt Panel
and Appellate Body reports; maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and
recommendations of panels and Appellate Body; and authorize suspension of concessions under
the Agreement.63 In short, the TFTA dispute settlement system, which is a precursor to the
AfCFTA-DSM is also modeled after the WTO. The bigger challenge with the TFTA is that it has
moved at a ridiculously slow pace that the AfCFTA is likely to enter into force before it.64 As a
collective, the TFTA represents an important cluster of states and regional groupings that are will
be important in shaping the AfCFTA. If as it seems the TFTA will come into force after the
requisite ratification, it will add another dimension to the overlap of WTO-Style courts on the
continent.
At the national level65, many African states have taken perceptible step away from international
arbitration in apparent display of the on-going discontent with formal dispute settlement systems.
For example, in 2015, South African enacted the Promotion of Investment Act, 2015. Section
15(5) provides that “The government may consent to international arbitration in respect of
investments covered by th[e] Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. [...]. Such
arbitration will be conducted between the Republic and the home state of the applicable
investor.” In 2016, Namibia enacted the Namibia Investment Promotion Act, 2016. Section 28(4)
328; Precious N. Ndlovu, “Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal”, (2011)
1 SADC Law Journal, pp. 63-79.
61 On the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, see generally, Frederick Cowell, “The Death of the Southern African
Development Community Tribunal’s Human Rights Jurisdiction”, (2013) 13:1 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 153165; Mia Swart, “A house of justice for Africa: Resurrecting the SADC Tribunal”, Brookings – Africa in Focus,
April 2, 2018. Online: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/02/a-house-of-justice-for-africaresurrecting-the-sadc-tribunal/
62
The
Tripartite
Free
Trade
Area
Agreement,
available
online:
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2018/TFTA%20_COMESA_EAC_SADC.pdf; Calestous Juma and Francis
Mangeni, “The benefits of Africa’s New Free Trade Area”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June
11, 2015. Online: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/benefits-africas-new-free-trade-area-0
63 Article 30 (1) & (2) (a-d).
64 “So far only four countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African
Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) tripartite bloc have both signed and
ratified the agreement. These are Kenya, Egypt, South Africa and Uganda. A total of 22 out of 26 countries have
signed the agreement.” See, TRALAC News, “Fresh push for states to ratify the Tripartite FTA as deadline draws
near”, Tralac, April 5, 2019. Online: https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13999-fresh-push-for-states-to-ratify-thetripartite-fta-as-deadline-draws-near.html
65 Outside Africa, the March 2018 Court of Justice of the European Union decision in Slovakia v Achmea BV (Case
C-284/16) marks a significant roll-back on the use of arbitration to settle intra-EU disputes under bilateral
investment treaties.
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provides that “the jurisdiction over disputes relating to this Act lies exclusively with the courts of
Namibia, but the Minister and investor or investment, as required by the circumstances of the
alleged breach of rights or obligations, may, by written agreement, agree to arbitration in
accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1965 (Act No. 42 of 1965) in Namibia.” In 2017, Tanzania
enacted, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017. Section 11(2)
provides that “disputes arising from extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural
wealth and resources shall be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established in the
United Republic and in accordance with laws of Tanzania.” They “shall not be a subject of
proceedings in any foreign court or tribunal.” More recently, Tanzania terminated its bilateral
investment treaty with the Netherlands.66
The point from the foregoing analysis is that the actions at the regional and national levels
demonstrate an ongoing discontent which African states continue to demonstrate with judicial
dispute mechanisms that they perceive are either significantly rules-based, legalistic, or in the
least are perceived as unfair to them. It is more interesting that the African states are not alone in
this discontent. The struggle for survival at the level of the WTO-DSM as well as the March
2018 Court of Justice of the European Union decision in Slovakia v Achmea BV (Case C-284/16)
marks a significant roll-back on the use of arbitration to settle intra-EU disputes under bilateral
investment treaties.
In the next section which concludes this paper, I highlight some factors which if addressed will
strengthen the AfCFTA-DSM.
V. Conclusion: Towards an Active and Relevant AfCFTA-DSM
That the drafters of the AfCFTA transplants the WTO DSM should not be equated with failure.
There is a window of opportunity that can be utilized to amend the dispute protocol in order to
reflect the judicial attitude of African states towards trade dispute settlement, while also
expanding the pool of actors to include private businesses who are the primary users of the
system. In this regard, I agree with James Thuo Gathii’s position that “the AfCFTA can learn
both from the experience of the WTO’s dispute settlement system as much as from the nonlitigious settlement of disputes from Africa’s sub-regional systems. In addition, the experience
and expertise of the sub-regional courts in Africa should inform how the AfCFTA’s dispute
settlement system develops and evolves.”67 Aside the foregoing, other critical factors that must
be addressed by drafter of the AfCFTA-DSM are addressed below.
First, the AfCFTA Member States will have to demonstrate an unfettered political willingness to
support the system whether it favours them or not. In other words, instances of backlash as was
the case with some of the regional community courts must be avoided. And while it sounds like
cliché, it is worth emphasizing that the measure of the success of the AfCFTA and its DSM is
James Thuo Gathii, “Understanding Tanzania’s Termination of its BIT with the Netherlands in Context”,
Afronomicslaw blog, April 1, 2019. Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/01/understanding-tanzaniastermination-of-its-bit-with-the-netherlands-in-context/
67 James Thuo Gathii, “Evaluating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free Trade
Agreement”; Afronomicslaw Blog, April 10, 2019. Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/10/evaluatingthe-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement/
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dependent of the political will that backs its implementation. Suffice to say therefore, that, the
momentum that has led to the ratification of the AfCFTA must be kept going even more so in the
early days.
Second, the Member States to the AfCFTA should amend the AfCFTA and its DSM in order to
allow the private sector as actors. The AfCFTA-DSM applies to disputes arising between State
Parties concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement.68 The
majority of the cross-border transactions that occur in Africa have been by private parties and
corporations. The rise in the relevance of the regional community courts is based on active use
by private parties. The AFCFTA and its DSM has significant utility for private businesses.69
Consequently, with Phase II negotiations on-going, the opportunity should be harnessed in order
to enhance the overall access to the dispute settlement regime under the AfCFTA.70 By so doing,
the AfCFTA-DSM will transcend the limitation in relation to economic integration disputes that
do not currently vest locus in private persons to sue over trade disputes. Further, such expansion
will nip in the bud the under-utilization critique that has been the case with regional economic
communities in economic integration matters.
Third, the AfCFTA-DSM must also be operationalized in a manner that does not constitute it as
an alternative dispute settlement system.71 Its originality, uniqueness and separateness vis-à-vis
the existing similar regional dispute mechanisms in the TFTA and SADC for example, must be
clearly articulated in its practice directions in order to discourage forum shopping by the state
parties.72 The text of the AfCFTA does little to discourage forum shopping. For example, Article
3, paragraph 4 of the AfCFTA Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes,
provides that State Parties may not “invoke another forum” on an issue if they have already
requested consultation under the AfCFTA.73 While this provision addresses the issue of duplicate
proceedings for disputes already brought before the AfCFTA-DSM, it does not go far enough in
prohibiting the inverse, that is, State Parties bringing an issue before the AfCFTA after it has
already been brought before a regional DSM. In seeking to develop a unified or cohesive body of
African international economic law based on the AfCFTA, it is critical to anticipate and
effectively address forum shopping issues given its potential to undermine a regime.
Finally, another factor that has contributed to the derailment of regional economic integration
aspirations in Africa is geo-political challenges and power dynamics. On the one hand,
colonialism and the manifestations of post-colonial legacies has consistently put the trust
Art 3 of the DSM Protocol
See, James Thuo Gathii, “The East African Court of Justice: Human Rights and Business Actors Compared” in
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, & Mikael Rask Madsen, International Court Authority, (Oxford, 2018), pp. 5981 (arguing that regional trade rules and dispute settlement mechanisms that have been transplanted from Europe
has had little salience for business actors.); Okechukwu C Iheduru, “Organized Business and Regional Integration in
Africa” (2015) 22 Review of International Political Economy 910
70 See, Mihreteab Tsighe, “Can the Dispute Settlement Mechanism be a Crown Jewel of the African Continental
Free Trade Area?, Afronomicslaw blog, April 8, 2019; Online: http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/08/can-thedispute-settlement-mechanism-be-a-crown-jewel-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-area/
71 John Ruhgangisa, “Parallel Jurisdiction of Courts: The View from the EACJ” (2010) 36 Commw. L. Bull. 575 at
576-78
72 Amos Saurombe, “An Analysis and Exposition of Dispute Settlement Forum Shopping for SADC Member
States” (2011) 23 S. Afr. Mercantile LJ 392
73 Protocol (of the AfCFTA) on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, 21 March 2018, Art 3(4).
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between and among Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone African Sates to test. The tension
and distrust between these regions remain potent and is a factor to the slow pace of economic
integration.74 In this regard, the norm of pan-African solidarity plays a significant role in
regulating and constraining interstate behavior amongst African states.75 Luwam Dirar argues
that the norm of pan-African solidarity originates from the shared historical experience of
African states with colonialism and domination.76 Although colonialism ended several years ago,
questions about the continued influence of the norms of solidarity in the struggle for
independence of African States continue to be relevant today. For example, African states’
individualized approach to the Economic Partnerships Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the
European Union have led to increasingly fragmented economic policies amongst African states.77
In this regard, the colonial and post-colonial histories of African states can also be a source of
contention that weighs on the socio-economic and political relations of African states that may
impact the AfCFTA. Apart from the linguistic barrier and colonial histories that plague economic
relations, the plight of small and/or land-locked African States must also be addressed in the
distributional effects of the AfCFTA. On the other hand, regional economic aspirations are
consistently pitched against the national economic policy of the states. Unsurprisingly, in this
battle, the national economy has emerged as the key priority for the member states. In addition,
even where the smaller African states have demonstrated their willingness for trade and
integration, the bigger economies within the network have not always followed with similar
mindset. The AfCFTA and its DSM will be embedded in this historical and extant contentions
and discontent among the state parties.78 The DSM therefore adds a new layer to the existing
geo-political and power dynamics.79 Thus, when assessing the prospects for the AfCFTA’s new
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, it is critical to understand some of the pre-existing dynamics of
African state-to-state relations. And in this process, there must be a balance of the national,
regional and continental policy spaces if the anticipated new economic and legal order of the
AfCFTA and its DSM must live up to their potentials.80
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